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ABSTRACT 
 
Emily M. Kelahan:  Clear and Distinct Perceptions of Extension in Descartes’s Meditations 
(Under the direction of Alan Nelson) 
 
    In the Synopsis of Meditations on First Philosophy Descartes claims that he will develop a 
clear and distinct perception of extension “partly in the Second Meditation, and partly in the 
Fifth and Sixth Meditations (CSM II p. 9).”  Unfortunately, many commentators completely 
ignore this explicit declaration of Descartes’s goal of developing a clear and distinct 
perception of extension over the course of the three aforementioned Meditations.  This leads 
to serious interpretive errors.  In this thesis I argue that it is important to take Descartes at his 
word in the Synopsis.  I also argue that doing so requires one to adopt a particular interpretive 
approach, which I contend is preferable to the alternatives.  Finally, I offer a model for 
understanding Descartes’s development of an enduring, indubitable clear and distinct 
perception of extension in the Meditations.  
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Section 1. 
 
Introduction 
    In the Synopsis of Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes claims that he will develop a 
“distinct concept” of extension “partly in the Second Meditation, and partly in the Fifth and 
Sixth Meditations (CSM II p. 9).”  Despite this explicit declaration of his intended goal of 
developing a clear and distinct perception of extension over the course of the three 
aforementioned Meditations, many commentators completely ignore this professed intention, 
which leads serious to interpretive errors.1  Descartes is never so explicit about his strategy 
for developing a clear and distinct perception of extension as he is in the Synopsis.  Thus, it is 
no surprise that his quite rich development of the perception is generally overlooked or under 
appreciated.  However, an investigation of how this perception is developed will not only 
illuminate the meditator’s arrival at her innate idea of extension, but also her innate ideas of 
self, God, and union.  It is an interesting feature of Descartes’s proof of extension that it 
requires the meditator to make three attempts at developing a clear and distinct perception of 
extension before she arrives at a perception that is enduring and indubitable.2  No other 
                                                 
1 I should pause to make a couple of terminological points.  First, Descartes generally uses the terms ‘concept’, 
‘idea’, and ‘perception’ interchangeably.  Though Descartes uses the term ‘concept’ in the quotation I reference, 
I prefer to use the term ‘idea’ because I think it highlights extension’s status as one of Descartes’s famous 
innate ideas.  I will also use the term ‘perception’ frequently to connect extension to the “truth rule” established 
in the Third Meditation.  Secondly, Descartes uses the term ‘corporeal nature’ in the Synopsis and I have chosen 
to use the term ‘extension’.  Descartes uses the terms ‘corporeal nature’, ‘extension’, ‘extended substance’, 
‘matter’, ‘material substance’, ‘body’ and derivative terms interchangeably. 
 
2 I refer to Descartes as “developing a clear and distinct perception of extension.”  In the Synopsis Descartes 
professes the need for a “distinct concept” of extension.  Most commentators agree that distinctness entails 
clarity.   
innate idea is quite so demanding.  There is much we can learn about the structure of the 
Meditations by charting the elusive development of the perception of this innate idea.   
    In this paper I give a novel perspective on three important passages in the Meditations: the 
“wax argument” of the Second Meditation, the examination of the “true and immutable 
natures” of the subject matter of geometry in the Fifth Meditation, and the proof for the 
existence of material things in the Sixth Meditation.  Most of my analysis is intended to 
supplement, rather than replace, the traditional accounts of these famous passages.  I do, 
however, recommend abandoning certain interpretive approaches as well as certain 
characterizations of Descartes’s objectives in the Meditations.  It is my hope that I am able to 
clearly display Descartes’s development of a clear and distinct perception of extension in the 
Meditations. 
Clear and Distinct Perceptions 
    It is important to take a moment to examine the nature and job of clear and distinct 
perceptions.  “Clear and distinct perception” does not immediately strike the reader as a 
technical term.  However, it is clear that Descartes did use it as a technical term and had a 
highly developed account of what goes into achieving clear and distinct perceptions.3  The 
account I offer of Descartes’s development of a clear and distinct perception of extension in 
the Meditations requires a full appreciation of the powerful role played by clear and distinct 
perception.  Descartes’s famous “truth rule”, a useful tool for navigating through the many 
confused and obscure perceptions the meditator encounters on the way to her clear and 
distinct perceptions, depends on a powerful notion of clear and distinct perception.  The 
“truth rule” comes in two formulations, one positive and one negative.  The positive 
                                                 
3 For a detailed account of Descartes’s systematic view of thinking and clear and distinct perceptions see Alan 
Nelson’s ‘Descartes’s Ontology of Thought’ and ‘Cartesian Innateness’. 
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formulation, given in the Third Meditation, establishes a procedure for determining 
perceptions of true things: 
    I am certain that I am a thinking thing.  Do I not therefore also know what is required 
for my being certain about anything?  In this first item of knowledge there is simply a 
clear and distinct perception of what I am asserting; this would not be enough to make 
me certain of the matter if it could ever turn out that something which I perceived with 
such clarity and distinctness was false.  So I now seem to be able to lay it down as a 
general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true (CSM Vol. II, p. 
24). 
 
Here it seems clear that Descartes does not think one arrives at true perceptions via inference.  
Rather, what goes on is a performance or intuitive grasping of a truth.4  What does the work 
for Descartes is not a traditional deductive proof, but rather, the mental state of the meditator.  
The negative formulation of the “truth rule” is given to us in the Fourth Meditation:  
    What is more, even if I have no power to avoid error in the first way just mentioned, 
which requires a clear perception of everything I have to deliberate on, I can avoid error 
in the second way, which depends merely on my remembering to withhold judgment on 
any occasion when the truth of the matter is not clear (CSM Vol. II, p. 43). 
 
This formulation of the “truth rule” establishes a procedure for avoiding falsity. 
    The case for understanding the meditator’s arrival at the truth of our innate ideas as a 
performance rather than the result of a deductive proof is bolstered by the fact that 
relationship to the will is, as Nelson argues, “perhaps the most salient feature of clear and 
distinct perceptions.”5  In the text of the Meditations and in the Second Replies Descartes is 
rather explicit about this relationship.  In the Fourth Meditation, for example, he writes: 
    …during these past few days I have been asking whether anything in the world exists, 
and I have realized that from the very fact of my raising this question it follows quite 
evidently that I exist.  I could not but judge that something which I understood so 
                                                 
4 Many ideas including interpretive approach, analysis of clear and distinct perception, and “cognitive routing” 
(a term I will employ in later sections of this paper) are borrowed and/or derived from class lectures given by 
Alan Nelson in his Modern Philosophy seminar at UNC-CH held during the Fall semester of 2006.  Class 
discussions with my peers also contributed greatly to my understanding of these ideas. 
 
5 Nelson, Alan.  ‘Descartes’s Ontology of Thought’, Topoi 16 (1997): 163-178, p 163. 
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clearly was true; but this was not because I was compelled so to judge by any external 
force, but because a great light in the intellect was followed by a great inclination in the 
will…(CSM Vol. II, p. 41). 
 
It is not the case, then, that when a meditator is entertaining a clear and distinct perception 
she will pause for evaluation before assenting to the truth contained in the perception.  Her 
will will assent automatically or she is not, in fact, entertaining a clear and distinct 
perception.    
    In addition to understanding clear and distinct perceptions by charting their relationship to 
the will, we also have the luxury of consulting Descartes’s own definitions of these terms.  In 
the Principles, Part I, 45, Descartes describes what is meant by “clear perception” and 
“distinct perception”: 
    I call a perception ‘clear’ when it is present and accessible to the attentive mind – just 
as we say that we see something clearly when it is present to the eye’s gaze and 
stimulates it with a sufficient degree of strength and accessibility.  I call a perception ‘ 
distinct’ if, as well as being clear, it is so sharply separated from all other perceptions 
that it contains within itself only what is clear (CSM Vol. I, pp. 207-208). 
 
There we have it, a clear and distinct perception is one that is present to the mind, accessible, 
sharply separated from other perceptions, and invariably affirmed by the will.  The only 
feature of Cartesian clear and distinct perceptions left to discuss is their relationship to the 
doctrine of innate ideas.  Descartes, a rationalist, thinks that certain of our ideas are innate, or 
“inborn” in us.  Most commentators agree that at least the ideas clearly and distinctly 
perceived by the meditator are, according to Descartes, innate.   
Interpretive Approaches  
    It is natural to discuss differences between my interpretive approach and that of other 
commentators who have written on this subject on the heels of my characterization of the 
relationship between clear and distinct perceptions and the doctrine of innate ideas.  Speaking 
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broadly and vulgarly, the major differences between my preferred interpretive approach to 
Descartes’s Meditations and that of well-known commentators, such as Daniel Garber and 
Desmond Clarke, are two.6  First, I take it as given that there are innate ideas to clearly and 
distinctly perceive.  That this is the case is simply a fundamental Cartesian premise.  In 
contrast, Garber especially, sees Descartes as needing to prove the existence of his innate 
ideas.  Consequently, Garber finds Descartes’s arguments for their existence less than 
satisfactory.7  Secondly, I see Descartes’s conception of the foundations of empirical science 
as falling out of his metaphysics.  This would seem obvious if it were not the case that 
commentators like Garber see Descartes’s metaphysics as serving his physics.  There is 
ample textual support for the view that Descartes saw his physics as following from his 
metaphysics rather than his metaphysics validating what he took to be good physics.  In the 
Preface to the Principles of Philosophy Descartes emphasizes the priority of metaphysics: 
    …the word ‘philosophy’ means the study of wisdom, and by ‘wisdom’ is meant not 
only prudence in our everyday affairs but also a perfect knowledge of all things that 
mankind is capable of knowing, both for the conduct of life and for the preservation of 
health and for the discovery of all manner of skills.  In order for this kind of knowledge 
to be perfect it must be deduced from first causes; thus, in order to set about acquiring it 
– and it is this activity to which the term ‘to philosophize’ strictly refers – we must start 
with the search for first causes or principles.  These principles must satisfy two 
conditions.  First, they must be so clear and so evident that the human mind cannot 
doubt their truth when it attentively concentrates on them; and, secondly, the knowledge 
of other things must depend on them, in the sense that the principles must be capable of 
being known without knowledge of these other matters, but not vice versa (CSM Vol. I, 
p. 179-180).    
                                                 
6 See Daniel Garber’s Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics and Desmond Clarke’s “The Existence of Matter” in 
The Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations. 
 
7 In Descartes’s Metaphysical Physics, Garber frequently saddles Descartes with the task of needing to show 
that our idea of body is an idea of a thing whose only properties are geometrical properties.  On my account, 
Descartes needn’t show that all other properties are excluded from our idea of body.  I take him to be showing 
that our clear and distinct perception of body is really a clear and distinct perception of pure extension, which 
has only geometrical properties.  We clearly and distinctly perceive body insofar as it comprises the subject 
matter of mathematics.  A good meditator’s will cannot but affirm the geometrical properties as belonging to 
extension.  Any other properties we perceive are obscure and confused.  
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It is a consequence of what Descartes considers proper order of philosophizing that we are 
more certain of metaphysical first principles than of the results of empirical science.  
Descartes says as much in his Discourse on the Method: 
    …if there are still people who are not sufficiently convinced of the existence of God 
and of their soul by the arguments I have proposed, I would have them know that 
everything else of which they may think themselves more sure – such as their having a 
body, there being stars and an earth, and the like – is less certain.  For although we have 
moral certainty about these things, so that it seems we cannot doubt them without being 
extravagant, nevertheless when it is a question of metaphysical certainty, we cannot 
reasonable deny that there are adequate grounds for not being entirely sure about them 
(CSM, Vol. I, pp. 129-130) 
 
In short, metaphysical first principles are both prior to and more certain than the results of 
physics. 
    I think my interpretive approach is preferable to those advocated by Garberian 
commentators for two reasons.  First, the principles of charity require us to take the 
systematicity of an early modern philosopher like Descartes seriously.  Once we have taken 
him to be a certain kind of philosopher, we will be able to see that premises, such as the 
existence of innate ideas and our ability to perceive them, which seem surprising to us are 
actually quite sensible for Descartes to take as given.  We should then see him as 
systematically and rigorously arguing from them to interesting conclusions.  If we do not 
grant Descartes these initial premises, we, like Garberian commentators, will see his project 
as going far off the rails not far from the station.  As I see it, Descartes is most open to 
criticism on account of the initial premises he accepts; not on account of the seemingly 
absurd conclusions he reaches.  Secondly, I do not think we should be seduced into believing 
that Descartes’s philosophy was driven by what he regarded to be good physics.  Descartes 
wrote many more pages on the sciences than he did on metaphysics, however, this does not 
mean that his metaphysics was intended to serve his physics.  In fact, he has made explicit 
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statements to the contrary, as quoted above.  It is important to make a distinction between 
Descartes’s biography and Descartes’s philosophical doctrines.
 7
 
Section 2. 
Strategy 
    The fact that developing an enduring, indubitable clear and distinct perception of extension 
takes Descartes three Meditations ranging from very near the beginning of the text until the 
final Meditation is a source of puzzlement.  Why isn’t the meditator able to completely 
achieve a clear and distinct perception of extension in the Second Meditation?  What has 
changed for the meditator by the time she arrives at the Sixth Meditation?  I have a 
hypothesis about why the meditator’s clear and distinct perception of extension takes so long 
to develop and about what has changed for her by the close of the Meditations.  The short 
answer to the first question is that she does achieve a clear and distinct perception of 
extension in the Second Meditation, and also, I think, in the Fifth.  What has changed by the 
time the meditator reaches the Sixth Meditation is that all of the doubts that previously 
impeded the meditator’s arrival at an enduring clear and distinct perception of extension are 
eliminated.  By the Sixth Meditation, the meditator has acquired all the tools she needs to 
eliminate the various manifestations of doubt that creep up over the course of the 
Meditations.    
    The doubts the meditator must eliminate in order to achieve an enduring and indubitable 
clear and distinct perception of extension come in four varieties: illusory doubt, dream doubt, 
defective nature doubt, and unknown faculty doubt.  Illusory doubt is the general skepticism 
about the senses that faces the meditator as early as the third paragraph of the First 
Meditation: “Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from 
the senses or through the senses.  But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, 
and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once (CSM Vol. 
II, p. 17).”  Close on its heels, is the introduction of dream doubt.  The dream doubt 
hypothesis is the following: if my dream experiences are qualitatively indistinguishable from 
my waking experiences, then I have no business placing more confidence in my waking 
experiences than in my dream experiences, which are dubitable.  The third variety of doubt at 
play in the Meditations is defective nature doubt.  Defective nature doubt takes many forms, 
but, at core, it is the idea that we may have a nature such that we go wrong even when we 
think our knowledge is most perfect.  Many commentators distinguish between madman 
doubt, deceptive God doubt, and evil demon doubt.  I, however, think these doubts are 
manifestations of defective nature doubt.  The madman example, the consideration that God 
might have made us such that we go wrong even in simple matters of arithmetic, and the 
possibility that a demon is trying his best to deceive us at all times are introduced as tools to 
remind us that we are still subject to defective nature doubt.8  The final obstacle to the 
meditator’s clear and distinct perception of extension is unknown faculty doubt.  Unknown 
faculty doubt makes its first appearance in the Third Meditation, becoming more prominent 
in the Fifth.  In the Fifth Meditation the meditator has a clear and distinct perception of 
something she knows not what.  When she contemplates the true and immutable natures of 
the objects of geometry, she knows their natures do not depend on her.  She does not know 
what possesses formally all of the reality these natures possess objectively.  Unknown faculty 
                                                 
8 For a more developed account of defective nature doubt see Newman and Nelson, ‘Circumventing Cartesian 
Circles’, Noûs 33:3 (1999) 370-404. 
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doubt is generated on account of the meditator’s inability to eliminate herself as the cause of 
her ideas of true and immutable natures.9  
    These various forms of doubt operate on the meditator’s modes of thought, forcing her to 
take particular “cognitive routes” to the innate ideas she is attempting to clearly and distinctly 
perceive.  “Cognitive route” is a term I will be employing to signify the particular confused 
modes of thought the meditator must use to access Descartes’s innate ideas under the various 
confused attributes they possess.  The doubts shape the “cognitive routes” the meditator must 
take and the “cognitive routes”, in turn, determine the attribute under which the innate idea in 
question is perceived.  Please allow me to make this clearer with an example:  
    When the meditator performs the cogito, she is placed on the doubting “cognitive 
route” by illusory doubt.  Illusory doubt determines her “cognitive route”.  Doubting, 
her “cognitive route”, in turn, forces her to perceive herself under the thinking attribute, 
which is, in this case, the principal attribute of the substance in question: thinking 
substance. 
 
“Cognitive routes”, modes, and attributes are shrouded in what Descartes calls confusion and 
obscurity.10  This makes perfect sense, as Descartes’s meditator is attempting to work from 
confused ideas to clear and distinct ones.  When she has actually arrived at a clear and 
distinct idea she will know she that has because her will will invariably and inevitably assent.  
I call this model for understanding the structure of the development of the meditator’s clear 
and distinct perception of extension the “doubt/route/attribute” model, as it traces the 
meditator’s path from doubt to “cognitive route” to the attribute under which she eventually 
arrives at a clear and distinct perception of extension.  In what remains of this paper I am 
                                                 
9 For a more developed account of unknown faculty and a general account of the structure of doubts in the 
Meditations see Lex Newman, ‘Descartes on Unknown Faculties and Our Knowledge of the External World’, 
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 103, No. 3, (Jul., 1994), 489-531. 
 
10 For a good discussion of Cartesian modes, attributes, and substances see Lawrence Nolan, ‘Reductionism and 
Nominalism in Descartes’s Theory of Attributes’, Topoi 16: 129-140, 1997.  
 10
going to use this model to explain the development of the meditator’s clear and distinct 
perception of extension in the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Meditations. 
    
 11
 
Section 3. 
A clear and distinct perception of extension in the Second Meditation 
    According to one standard interpretation, the purpose of the famous “wax argument” of the 
Second Meditation is to show us that we are more certain of ourselves as thinking things than 
of the objects of sense perception.  In short, mind is better known than body.11  I agree with 
this interpretation, however, I think it is important to emphasize the secondary purpose of this 
passage.  The wax argument does some important foreshadowing of what is to come and it 
displays one attribute under which extension can be clearly and distinctly perceived.  It will 
be helpful to review at this time the structure of the wax passage.  For my purposes, those of 
developing a supplementary account of the wax argument that displays the partial 
development of the meditator’s clear and distinct perception of extension, the wax argument 
is best understood as developed in three stages.  In the first stage, Descartes begins by 
considering a piece of wax just taken from the honeycomb: 
    …it has not yet quite lost the taste of honey; it retains some of the scent of the flowers 
from which it was gathered; its color, shape, and size are plain to see; it is hard, cold, 
and can be handled without difficulty; if you rap it with your knuckle it makes a sound.  
In short, it has everything which appears necessary to enable a body to be known as 
distinctly as possible (CSM Vol. II, p. 20). 
 
The sensory qualities of the body appear, at first, very distinct.  However, if you place the 
wax near the fire, these qualities change completely.  The wax loses its smell and taste; its 
color, shape, and size change; it becomes liquid, hot, and difficult to handle; and it no longer 
                                                 
11 According to another standard interpretation, the purpose of the wax argument is to find the essence of 
matter. 
makes a sound when you rap it with your knuckle.  We do not conclude from these 
observations that the wax no longer remains.  On the contrary, we are sure of this.  However, 
it is difficult to pinpoint just why we are sure of this. 
    We know the sensible qualities of the wax are not essential to it.  The wax that tastes of 
honey and the wax that does not taste of honey is the same wax.  Perhaps the wax is a body 
that presents itself to us in various different forms.  In the second stage of the argument, 
Descartes encourages the meditator to contemplate whatever is left of the wax when the 
sensory qualities we seem to perceive in it are removed: 
    But what exactly is it that I am now imagining?  Let us concentrate, take away 
everything which does not belong to the wax, and see what is left: merely something 
extended, flexible and changeable (CSM Vol. II, p. 20). 
 
When the meditator uses her imagination to arrive at the conclusion that the properties that 
constitute the wax are those of flexibility and changeability she comes close to arriving at the 
essence of the wax.  However, the essence of the wax cannot be captured by meditator’s 
imagination. 
    During the third stage of the wax argument, the meditator realizes that her imagination is 
not what allows her to know the wax as flexible and changeable.  She begins to hone in on 
the faculty actually responsible for this knowledge.  She notices that “the wax is capable of 
countless changes…yet I am unable to run through this immeasurable number of changes in 
my imagination, from which it follows that it is not the faculty of imagination that gives me 
my grasp of the wax as flexible and changeable (CSM Vol. II, p. 21).”  The meditator is 
forced to conclude that the nature of the wax is “in no way revealed by my imagination, but 
is perceived by the mind alone (CSM Vol. II, p. 21).”  In the third stage of the argument the 
meditator has ruled out her faculties of sensation and imagination as responsible for her 
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knowledge of the wax.  Her clear and distinct perception of the wax, she realizes, is 
facilitated by pure understanding: 
    The perception I have of [the wax] is a case not of vision or touch or imagination- nor 
has it ever been, despite previous appearances- but of pure mental scrutiny; and this can 
be imperfect and confused, as it was before, or clear and distinct as it is now, depending 
on how carefully I concentrate on what the wax consists in (CSM Vol. II, p. 21). 
 
There we have it: the meditator does indeed develop a clear and distinct perception of 
extension in the Second Meditation.   
    Of course, this clear and distinct perception is not long-lived.  As is well known, the wax 
argument, traditionally understood, takes a definitive turn at this point.  Descartes’s meditator 
begins to realize that she is far more certain of herself than of her ideas of body.  For my 
supplementary account of the wax argument, this is a pivotal point as well.  The meditator 
has clearly and distinctly perceived something in the wax, which we know from the Synopsis, 
must be extension, but this perception is fleeting.  It does not take much to distract the 
unpracticed meditator.  Once her concentration is broken, she is consumed by defective 
nature doubt: “…as I reach this conclusion I am amazed at how <weak and> prone to error 
my mind is (CSM, Vol. II, p. 21).”     
    Now that I have outlined the general structure of the wax passage of the Second 
Meditation, please allow me to apply the “doubt/route/attribute” model more perspicuously.  
In the first stage of the wax argument illusory doubt forces the meditator to abandon 
sensation as a “cognitive route” to the essence of the wax, which we, having read all six 
Meditations, know is extension.  Illusory doubt, in effect, forces the meditator off of the 
sensation “cognitive route” and onto the imagination “cognitive route”.  Once on the 
imagination “cognitive route”, the meditator is not forced off of this route by a doubt of one 
kind or another, but rather by her own realization that the potentialities of the wax outstrips 
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her ability to imagine them.  This realization quickly places her on the understanding, or 
“pure mental scrutiny”, “cognitive route”.  This “cognitive route” leads her to a clear and 
distinct perception of extension under the attributes of flexibility and changeability.  Her 
figurative travels on the understanding “cognitive route” end abruptly when defective nature 
doubt enters the scene.  Not having much practice as a meditator, she is unable to hold onto 
her clear and distinct perception, and falls back into skepticism regarding external things.  An 
interesting feature of the Second Meditation that will not be entirely clear until the close of 
this paper is that Descartes does some very explicit foreshadowing of events to come.  In my 
supplementary account of the wax argument, Descartes actually mentions all three of the 
“cognitive routes” the meditator will explore in her quest for a clear and distinct perception 
of extension, including the route that will, once all of the doubts have been laid to rest, lead 
her to an enduring, indubitable clear and distinct perception of extension.  Another way to 
think about the path the meditator is forced to travel in the Second Meditation is to focus on 
the number of doubts that require removal, rather than the number of routes on which the 
meditator travels.  She takes three “cognitive routes” because there are two doubts to which 
she must respond: one about truth generally (illusory doubt) and the other about the identity 
of the truth. 
    Below you will find a figure representing the “doubt/route/attribute” model as applied to 
the wax argument of the Second Meditation.  The oval containing the letters ‘EXT’ 
represents the innate idea of extension the meditator is attempting to clearly and distinctly 
perceive.  I have chosen to represent the attributes of flexibility and changeability as one of 
the facets of an octagon.  This way of representing the attributes is intended to make clear 
that the attribute structure of ideas is imposed by the meditator, and is not a part of the idea 
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itself.  That is, we as meditators impose the attribute structure onto the ideas we perceive, but 
the ideas themselves are simple.  The rectangle labeled ‘Meditator (thinking substance)’ 
represents the meditator.  The upward pointing arrow extending from the rectangle represents 
the “cognitive route” taken by the meditator to her clear and distinct perception of extension.  
The horizontal line labeled ‘Defective Nature Doubt’ represents the particular doubt that 
prevents the meditator from achieving an enduring clear and distinct perception of extension.  
Finally, the diagonal line extending from ‘Defective Nature Doubt’ to the oval containing the 
word ‘Self’ represents the meditator’s retreat to an idea of which she is more certain than 
extension.  The oval containing the word ‘Self’ represents the meditator’s clear and distinct 
perception of herself qua thinking thing.     
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Section 4. 
A clear and distinct perception of extension in the Fifth Meditation 
    With regard to the Second Meditation I suggested that a careful reader of Descartes’s 
Mediations should acknowledge that there is a secondary purpose of the wax argument.  The 
wax argument is used primarily to establish that the meditator has more certain knowledge of 
herself as a thinking thing than she has of body, but it is also important to notice the impact 
the wax passage has on the development of the meditator’s clear and distinct perception of 
extension.  My analysis of the meditator’s contemplation of the true and immutable natures 
of the subject matter of geometry in the Fifth Meditation is more aggressive than my analysis 
of the wax argument of the Second Meditation, and is intended to replace, rather than 
supplement, the traditional interpretation. 
    The “true and immutable natures” of the Fifth Meditation have puzzled many 
commentators, leading them to make such misguided assertions as “Descartes is a Platonist 
about mathematics.”  Traditional interpretations of the “true and immutable natures” passage 
seem to miss the connection between the work that was done in the Second Meditation and 
the work about to be done in the Sixth.  Thus, it is often assumed that Descartes is either 
trying to develop a form of Platonism or is trying to use the “true and immutable natures” 
discussion to lay some groundwork for the ontological proof of God’s existence he gives in 
the Fifth Meditation.  Margaret Wilson, for example, writes: 
    Descartes tries to enlist the conception of true and immutable natures as a bulwark for 
the ontological argument.  He wants to hold that only true and immutable natures can be 
used in deductions that derive real predications from concepts.  This is supposed to 
forestall certain kinds of counter-examples, that would tend to show that the ontological 
argument if sound could be readily adapted to prove the existence of myriads of 
things…12
 
Pierre Gassendi was probably the first commentator to suspect Descartes of Platonism.  In 
the Fifth Set of Objections he writes, “But I do not want to stop and raise objections here; I 
will only suggest that it seems very hard to propose that there is any ‘immutable and eternal 
nature’ apart from almighty God (CSM Vol. II, p. 221).”  It is clear from this quotation that 
Gassendi believes Descartes to be discussing some kind of bizarre “other realm” entity.  
Many contemporary commentators have followed in this tradition.  I do not think Descartes 
was a Platonist, nor do I think he was setting himself up for the ontological argument with an 
intriguing discussion of the “true and immutable natures” of the objects of geometry.  There 
is a much more charitable and a much more sensible way to interpret this passage.13   
    To begin, it is important to review what has transpired since the meditator’s momentary 
clear and distinct perception of extension in the Second Meditation.  As mentioned in the 
Introduction to this paper, Descartes develops the “truth rule” in the Third and Fourth 
Meditations.  I hope this was made clear then, but it is worth reiterating now that this rule 
does work for Descartes only if we grant him a strong theory of clear and distinct 
perceptions.  The “truth rule” helps the meditator to realize that she is, in fact, contemplating 
something true when she contemplates the “true and immutable natures” of the subject matter 
of geometry.  She can tell that she has successfully clearly and distinctly perceived 
something, though she cannot tell what.  This is, of course, because she has a present and 
                                                 
12 Wilson, Margaret.  Descartes, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 172. 
 
13 For more on the “true and immutable natures” of the Fifth Meditations see Lawrence Nolan’s ‘The 
Ontological Status of Cartesian Natures’, Pacific Philosophy Quarterly 78 (1997) 169-194.  Nolan gives and 
defends an alternative account of the Fifth Meditation “true and immutable nature” passage that both avoids the 
interpretive errors of his predecessors and reconciles the passage with Descartes’s Principles.  
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accessible idea that is sharply separated from all other ideas to which her will cannot help but 
assent.  Descartes also gives a causal argument for God’s existence between the Second and 
the Fifth Meditations.  In the Third Meditation, Descartes argues that God must exist because 
only God could be responsible for the idea the meditator has of God.  This proof coupled 
with the ontological proof for God’s existence he will give in the Fifth Meditation will help 
the meditator to combat one of the doubts I mentioned in the second section of this paper: 
defective nature doubt.  The opportunity to lay this doubt to rest, however, will not present 
itself until the Sixth Meditation.  As in the Second Meditation, the clear and distinct 
perception of extension the meditator achieves in the Fifth Meditation is momentary because 
it shifts into a clear and distinct perception of something more certain.  
    Let us take a closer look at the opening pages of the Fifth Meditation.  The meditator, now 
in possession of a procedure for discriminating between truth and falsity, turns her attention 
to material things: 
    But now that I have seen what to do and what to avoid in order to reach the truth, the 
most pressing task seems to be to try to escape from the doubts into which I fell a few 
days ago, and see whether any certainty can be achieved regarding material objects 
(CSM Vol.  II, p. 63). 
 
The meditator’s first step in this investigation is to examine her ideas of material things, 
which are merely modes of thought, so as to determine which ones are clear and distinct and 
which are obscure and confused.  The meditator discovers that of all of her ideas of material 
things, she most clearly and distinctly perceives quantity.  Specifically, she perceives the 
extension of “the thing which is quantified (CSM Vol. II, p. 63).”  She can enumerate many 
features of the thing she clearly and distinctly perceives, such as its having parts and these 
parts having specified sizes, shapes, positions, motions, and durations.  She clearly and 
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distinctly perceives quantity not only generally, but also in particular cases.  The truth of 
these perceptions is completely transparent to her. 
    Having recognized the truth of her perceptions of quantity, the meditator immediately 
launches into an investigation of the source of this truth: 
    But I think the most important consideration at this point is that I find within me 
countless ideas of things which even though they may not exist anywhere outside of me 
still cannot be called nothing; for although in a sense they can be thought of at will, they 
are not my invention but have their own true and immutable natures (CSM Vol. II, p. 
63). 
 
The meditator is quite sure that the geometrical figures she has been contemplating do not 
rely on her for their reality.  She observes that though no figure may exist outside of her 
corresponding to her idea of, for example, a triangle, the triangle nevertheless possesses a 
unique, unalterable nature that is in no way constructed by her.  She knows this because she 
is able to demonstrate many properties of the triangle that could not have been somehow 
invented by her.  Furthermore, she knows that her ideas of geometrical figures do not come 
to her through her dubious faculty of sensation, for although some figure-ideas, such as 
triangles, may have entered the meditator’s mind through the senses, there are countless other 
figures of which there is no suspicion that they were encountered with the senses.  The 
meditator does not make much headway on finding the source of the truth she perceives, but 
she remains certain that she does perceive a truth: 
    All these properties [properties demonstrated to be true of my figure-ideas] are 
certainly true, since I am clearly aware of them, and therefore they are something, and 
not merely nothing; for it is obvious that whatever is true is something; and I have 
already amply demonstrated that everything of which I am clearly aware is true.  And 
even if I had not demonstrated this, the nature of my mind is such that I cannot but 
assent to these things, at least so long as I clearly perceive them (CSM Vol. II, p. 64). 
 
The meditator has undoubtedly achieved a clear and distinct perception of something, which 
we, having read the Synopsis, are privileged to know, is extension.  Having a much more 
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developed clear and distinct perception of her innate idea of God, she turns to this idea once 
more, abandoning extension until the Sixth Meditation. 
    The “doubt/route/attribute” model applies slightly less directly to the Fifth Meditation than 
to the Second.  This is because it is not as obvious how the doubts are working to shape the 
path of the meditator in this case.  One thing that is clear is that the meditator is not permitted 
to take the sensation “cognitive route” at this time, as she has not yet eliminated illusory 
doubt.  The meditator instead takes the imagination “cognitive route” that was abandoned 
midway through the wax argument on account of its limitations with respect to making sense 
of the attributes of flexibility and changeability.  This time the meditator is honing in on a 
different attribute of extension: quantity, or the true and immutable natures of the subject 
matter of geometry.  Imagination is well suited to contemplate this attribute.  To recapitulate 
more perspicuously, illusory doubt forces the meditator to take either the understanding 
“cognitive route” or the imagination “cognitive route”.  Having already pursued the 
understanding “cognitive route” to a clear and distinct perception of extension under the 
attributes of flexibility and changeability, the meditator takes the imagination “cognitive 
route” in the Fifth Meditation to a clear and distinct perception of extension under the 
attribute of quantity.  The meditator quickly loses her grip on this clear and distinct 
perception because she is unable to determine in what its formal reality consists, and her 
attention shifts to something of which she is more certain: God.   
    Below you will find a figure representing the “doubt/route/attribute” model as applied to 
the true and immutable natures discussion of the Fifth Meditation.  The representations in 
figure 1.2 are identical to those of figure 1.1 with the exception of one additional geometrical 
representation and a few label modifications.  The additional geometrical representation is 
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the oval containing the word ‘God’ located next to the oval containing the word ‘Self’.  By 
the Fifth Meditation the meditator has a second idea of which she is more certain than 
extension, God.  You will also notice that the horizontal line representing the doubt that 
prevents the meditator from achieving a clear and distinct perception of extension is 
identified by two additional labels: ‘Dream doubt’ and ‘Unknown Faculty doubt’.  The 
attribute represented by the indicated facet of the octagon is labeled ‘Quantity’.  Finally, the 
“cognitive route” represented by the upward pointing arrow is labeled ‘Imagination’.     
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Section 5. 
A clear and distinct perception of extension in the Sixth Meditation 
    An enduring and indubitable clear and distinct perception of extension is finally achieved 
in the Sixth Meditation with Descartes’s famous proof of the existence of material things.  
Before I summarize how this task is accomplished, it is beneficial to situate the proof in the 
context of the other five Meditations.  In the First Meditation Descartes introduces a 
methodology, the method of doubt, which calls into question the foundation of our 
knowledge.  He also imposes an order for the building of a new foundation that dictates what 
is to be accomplished in the subsequent Meditations.  In the First through the Fourth 
Meditations Descartes attempts to demonstrate the existence of the self qua thinking thing, 
God, and, less successfully, extension, while defending these ideas against skeptical doubts.  
The Fifth Meditation places the meditator at an interesting starting point for the Sixth 
Meditation. 
    In the Fifth Meditation the meditator has a clear and distinct perception of extension, but 
she is not sure of what truth it gives her knowledge.  The big question at the start of the Sixth 
Meditation is: what formally has all of the reality that is contained objectively in the 
meditator’s clear and distinct perception of a true and immutable nature?  In the Fifth 
Meditation the meditator does not yet have the tools she needs to eliminate the possibility 
that the formal reality of her clear and distinct perception of a “true and immutable nature” 
consists in the self qua thinking thing or in God.  The Sixth Meditation is designed in part to 
eliminate those possibilities and much of the proof of the existence of material things will be 
dedicated to doing just that.  I should take a moment at this point to reiterate the controversial 
nature of this interpretation.  Many commentators would, as mentioned in the previous 
sections, claim that the true and immutable natures of the subject matter of geometry contain 
formally all of the objective reality the meditator perceives in the ideas she contemplates.  I 
suggest that we should not believe that the story ends there, especially since Descartes has 
told us in no uncertain terms in the Synopsis that he addresses subject matter in the Fifth 
Meditation that is ultimately to be tied up in the Sixth Meditation.  The idea that the formal 
reality of the meditator’s Fifth Meditation clear and distinct perception of quantity consists in 
a quasi-Platonic “true and immutable nature” is at odds with Descartes’s methodology and 
creates systemic interpretive problems.  As Lawrence Nolan writes: 
    …the Platonist interpretation is untenable.  Besides undercutting Cartesian dualism 
by admitting created substances that are distinct from minds and bodies, it commits 
Descartes to an account of natures which violates the method of universal doubt.  If in 
the Fifth Meditation Descartes were positing abstract Platonic entities, then he would be 
guilty of smuggling in things which are at least as susceptible to methodic doubt as 
corporeal objects, but which are not justified anywhere in the argument of the 
Meditations.  Unless one is content to suppose that Descartes was extremely careless or 
openly deceitful, this consideration alone is fatal to the Platonist reading.14
 
  It seems much more reasonable to take Descartes at his word in the Synopsis and see him as 
working up to an enduring clear and distinct perception of extension in the Sixth Meditation 
with his discussion of the true and immutable natures of the subject matter of geometry in the 
Fifth.15  
                                                 
14 Nolan, Lawrence.  “The Ontological Status of Cartesian Natures”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1997), 
p. 171. 
 
15 See David Cunning’s unfinished manuscript ‘Confusion and Mind-Body Union’ and Lawrence Nolan’s ‘The 
Ontological Status of Cartesian Natures’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1997) or ‘Reductionism and 
Nominalism in Descartes’s Theory of Attributes’, Topoi 16: 129-140, 1997 for more on this alternative 
interpretation. 
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    For ease of exposition, I am going to include a somewhat shallow numerical representation 
of Descartes’s Sixth Meditation proof of the existence of material things.  Once it is on the 
table, I will justify and explain the steps: 
(1) I have a passive faculty of sense perception, but this requires a complementary 
active faculty since every action requires a passion and vice versa. 
 
(2) The active faculty cannot be in me because I am not aware of it.  It presupposes 
effort on my part, and I do not put out any effort. 
 
(3) I am wholly and essentially thought (Proof of the Real Distinction). 
(4) I clearly and distinctly perceive God, and I know she is no deceiver. 
(5) God has given me a great inclination to believe that my sense perceptions are 
produced by material things. 
 
(6) God has not given me a faculty for determining that she is the source, formally or 
eminently, directly or indirectly, of my sense perceptions. 
 
(7) I cannot doubt the contents of a truly clear and distinct perception when I am 
clearly and distinctly perceiving it. 
 
(8) Insofar as material things are quantified bits of extension, I clearly and distinctly 
perceive them.  Therefore, 
 
(9) Material things exist insofar as they are quantified bits of extension. 
The conclusion that material things exist is tantamount to proving the existence of extension, 
as Descartes thinks that we can clearly and distinctly perceive material things only insofar as 
they are modes of extension. 
Process of Elimination, part I 
    The task of this proof is to execute an important process of elimination, that of eliminating 
the self qua thinking thing and God as possible formal causes of the meditator’s sensory 
ideas of material things.   Premises (1)-(3) are designed to block the possibility that the 
meditator qua thinking thing is responsible for her clear and distinct perception of the “true 
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and immutable natures” of the subject matter of geometry.  They are intended to make clear 
that the meditator is not herself responsible for the active faculty required for sense 
perception.16  This arm of the process of elimination lays to rest one of the doubts the 
meditator must remove in order to achieve an enduring, indubitable clear and distinct 
perception of extension: unknown faculty doubt.  These premises derive their strength from 
the Sixth Meditation proof of the real distinction between mind and body.  In a moment I will 
attempt to reconstruct that proof, but first I should cite a bit of supportive text: 
    I find in myself certain special modes of thinking, namely imagination and sense 
perception.  Now I can distinctly understand myself as a whole without these faculties; 
but I cannot, conversely, understand these faculties without me, that is, without an 
intellectual substance to inhere in.  This is because there is an intellectual act included in 
their essential definition; and hence I perceive that the distinction between them and 
myself corresponds to the distinction between the modes of a thing and the thing itself.  
Of course, I also recognize that there are other faculties (like those of changing position, 
of taking on various shapes, and so on), which, like sensory perception and imagination, 
cannot be understood apart from some substance for them to inhere in, and hence cannot 
exist without it.  But it is clear that these other faculties, if they exist, must be in a 
corporeal or extended substance and not an intellectual one; for the clear and distinct 
conception of them includes extension, but does not include any intellectual act 
whatsoever (CSM Vol. II, pp. 54-55, my emphasis).    
 
Below you will find a reconstruction of the proof of the real distinction between mind and 
body derived from the quotation above: 
(1) I clearly and distinctly perceive thought “as a whole.”  (In the above quotation 
“myself” refers to thinking substance.)  
 
(2) I clearly and distinctly perceive extension “as a whole.”  (In the above quotation 
Descartes cites position, shape, etc as modes of a substance that cannot be 
intellectual because a clear and distinct perception of those modes essentially 
“includes extension, but does not include any intellectual act whatsoever.”) 
 
(3) The clear and distinct perceptions in (1) and (2) are distinct from each other (that 
is, they exclude each other). 
                                                 
16 I should distinguish between two senses of “responsible.”  In one sense, the self is responsible for clear and 
distinct ideas in that they are innate.  The other sense is that in which the objective reality of those ideas 
represent something other than the self.   
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(4) God is omnipotent and capable of creating everything that I am capable of 
perceiving as I perceive it. 
 
(5) Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true. 
 
(6) I clearly and distinctly perceive that I am a thinking substance only.  Therefore, 
 
(7) I exist completely as a thinking substance.   
 
This proof establishes that the meditator exists completely as a thinking thing.  Though she 
may be joined to a body, that body cannot supply her with an intellectual faculty that is 
responsible for the content of her clear and distinct perception of extension.   
    To eliminate the possibility that the thinking substance is responsible for the meditator’s 
clear and distinct perception of extension, the meditator must accomplish two tasks.  First, 
she must show that none of the intellectual faculties of which she is aware of possessing 
supply the active faculty responsible for the perception of extension.  Then, she must show 
that she cannot be in possession of an unknown intellectual faculty responsible for her 
perception of extension.  Let us begin with the first task.  In the Sixth Meditation Descartes 
mentions and contrasts three mental faculties: understanding, imagination, and sensation.   
He begins by contrasting understanding and imagination:   
    I notice quite clearly that imagination requires a peculiar effort of the mind which is 
not required for understanding; this additional effort of the mind clearly shows the 
difference between imagination and pure understanding…[Furthermore], this power of 
imagining is not a necessary constituent of my own essence…For if I lacked it, I would 
undoubtedly remain the same individual as I now am; from which it seems to follow 
that it depends on something distinct from myself (CSM Vol. II, p. 51). 
 
Descartes clearly thinks that neither understanding nor imagination could be responsible for 
the meditator’s sensory ideas.  However, it is not entirely clear why understanding is ruled 
out.  “Understanding” just is having ideas, so, in one sense, sensory ideas are caused by the 
understanding, the sense in which they are ontologically dependent on the understanding qua 
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ideas.  On the other hand, there is a sense in which the understanding is passive with regard 
to sensory ideas, the sense in which the understanding does not seem to supply the content of 
the ideas.  That is, the sensory ideas seem to come quite against the meditator’s will.  The 
understanding, then, cannot be the active faculty responsible for sense perception.   
    The imagination, unlike the understanding, is active in that it requires a special effort on 
the part of the meditator.  The imagination is an “active faculty”, but it cannot be the active 
intellectual faculty responsible for the meditator’s sense perception for three reasons.  First, 
as indicated in the quotation above, the faculty of imagination is not essential to the 
meditator.  Secondly, sensory ideas do not require any effort on the part of the thinking 
substance, and the imagination requires a “peculiar effort.”  Finally, the objects of the 
imagination clearly seem to be copied from sensory ideas: “I perceive these things much 
better by means of the senses, which is how, with the assistance of memory, they appear to 
have reached the imagination (CSM Vol. II, p. 51).”  The imagination involves the will, but 
sensation does not.  Therefore, the meditator’s having the faculty of imagination does not 
establish the existence of the body on which it seems to depend. 
    The meditator has completed her first task, that of showing that none of the intellectual 
faculties of which she is aware she possesses supply the active faculty required for sense 
perception.  Now we must examine her execution of the second task, that of showing that she 
cannot be in possession of an unknown intellectual faculty responsible for her sensory ideas 
of body.  The meditator is clearly worried about this doubt:  
    And despite the fact that the perceptions of the senses were not dependent on my will, 
I did not think that I should on that account infer that they proceeded from things 
distinct from myself, since I might perhaps have a faculty not yet known to me which 
produced them (CSM Vol. II, pp. 53-54). 
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Just how the meditator eliminates unknown faculty doubt is not immediately apparent.17  It is 
beneficial to take a moment at this time to explain what constitutes an unknown faculty.  The 
unknown faculty worry is essentially this: the meditator’s sensory ideas of body and the 
faculty responsible for her sensory ideas of body may both be modes of the thinking 
substance, however, she is aware of the ideas but not of their cause, which is also in her qua 
thinking thing.  In short, both the sensory ideas and their cause may inhere in the thinking 
substance without the meditator’s knowledge.  To eliminate this worry, she must show that 
the cause of her sensory ideas of body does not inhere in the thinking substance.  
    Though Descartes is not at all explicit about this in the text of the Meditations, he is 
committed to the epistemic transparency thesis, “according to which there is nothing in the 
mind of which we are not aware.”18  In a letter to Mersenne, Descartes writes:  
    What I say later, ‘nothing can be in me, that is to say, in my mind, of which I am not 
aware’, is something which I proved in my Meditations, and it follows from the fact that 
the soul is distinct from the body and that its essence is to think (CSMK Vol. III, pp. 
165-166).19
 
If the meditator’s thought is completely transparent, then introspection will make known to 
her all of the operations of her intellectual faculties, whether those faculties are known or 
unknown.  The meditator is aware of all current operations of her mind.  Thus, if she 
possesses an unknown faculty, she will at least be aware of its operations when they occur.  
Since the meditator is aware of everything in her present thought, when she is having a 
sensation, she is aware of all the intellectual faculties required by that sensation.  She is not 
                                                 
17 For a more developed account of unknown faculty doubt see Lex Newman, ‘Descartes on Unknown Faculties 
and Our Knowledge of the External World’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Jul., 1994), 489-531. 
 
18 Newman, Lex.  ‘Descartes on Unknown Faculties and Our Knowledge of the External World’, The 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Jul., 1994), p. 496. 
19 See also First Set of Replies, CSM Vol. II, p. 77. 
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aware of an active faculty in her.  Therefore, the active faculty must not reside in the thinking 
substance.  
    The final nail in the coffin of unknown faculty doubt is delivered by the meditator’s own 
clear and distinct perceptions.  In the Introduction I argued that Descartes must be interpreted 
as employing a very strong, technical concept of clear and distinct perception.  If we grant 
him this, it follows from the meditator’s clear and distinct perceptions of herself and of God 
that she cannot be in possession of unknowable faculties.  By definition, the meditator’s clear 
and distinct perception of herself cannot include the confused idea of unknowable faculties.  
Additionally, the meditator’s clear and distinct perception of God affirms that God is not a 
deceiver.  Resultantly, God would not condemn the meditator to confused perceptions, which 
never reveal the true nature of the innate ideas given to her by God.  Finally, part of her clear 
and distinct perception of extension must be the perception that her ideas of material things 
are not produced by her.  The epistemic transparency thesis does a lot of work here.  The 
meditator’s thought is self-aware.  If there is nothing but thought in the meditator, which was 
proven by the proof of the real distinction, then there is nothing in thought of which she is 
unaware.    
Process of Elimination, part II 
    Premises (4)-(7) are designed to eliminate the possibility that the objective reality of the 
meditator’s sensory ideas of material things is derived from God.  The premises should 
establish that the truth of which the meditator gains knowledge through her clear and distinct 
perception of extension is not God.  This arm of the process of elimination is easier to 
execute than the previous arm.  It follows from the meditator’s own clear and distinct 
perception of God that God cannot be the source of her sensory ideas of body.  By the Sixth 
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Meditation the meditator has two proofs of God’s existence and is able to achieve clear and 
distinct perceptions of God with ease.  If the meditator’s perception of God included a 
deceptive nature, this perception would be confused and obscure, not clear and distinct.  As it 
stands, the meditator’s perception of God is quite clear and distinct, and she is certain that 
God is no deceiver.  God gave the meditator a great inclination to believe that her sensory 
ideas of body are caused by external things, and God gave the meditator no faculty for 
removing this inclination by determining that she is the source of the meditator’s sensory 
ideas: 
    But since God is not a deceiver, it is quite clear that he does not transmit the ideas (of 
extended things) to me either directly from himself, or indirectly, via some creature 
which contains the objective reality of the ideas not formally but only eminently.  For 
God has given me no faculty at all for recognizing any such source for these ideas; on 
the contrary, he has given me a great propensity to believe that they are produced by 
corporeal things.  So I do not see how God could be understood to be anything but a 
deceiver if the ideas were transmitted from a source other than corporeal things (CSM 
Vol. II, p. 55). 
 
God would be a deceiver if she were the cause of the meditator’s sensory ideas of body 
because God has given the meditator an irresistible inclination to believe otherwise.  Thus, 
the meditator can confidently conclude that God is not the cause of her sensory ideas of 
body.  The meditator’s clear and distinct perception of God not only guarantees that God is 
not the source of the meditator’s sensory ideas of body, but it also guarantees that the 
meditator’s clear and distinct perception of extension indeed represents the essence of 
material things.  God’s veracity guarantees that things are as the meditator clearly and 
distinctly perceives them.       
    I am now going to apply the “doubt/route/attribute” model to the development of the 
meditator’s clear and distinct perception of extension in the Sixth Meditation.  Once I have 
completed this task, I am going to explain more perspicuously how each of the doubts I 
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discussed in the second section if this paper is systematically eliminated by the close of the 
Meditations.  The meditator is finally allowed to follow the sensation “cognitive route” in the 
Sixth Meditation because her clear and distinct perceptions of God achieved in the Third and 
Fifth Meditations guarantee that her senses cannot be completely unreliable.  These clear and 
distinct perceptions also guarantee that the meditator cannot have a nature such that she 
always goes wrong even in matters of which she feels most certain.  In other words, illusory 
doubt and defective nature doubt are almost completely eliminated by the close of the Fifth 
Meditation by the meditator’s clear and distinct perceptions of God.  In the case of the Sixth 
Meditation, the meditator’s path is shaped more so by the elimination of doubts than by the 
presence of doubts.  Because the meditator can place more confidence in her senses in the 
Sixth Meditation than in any previous Meditation, the sensation “cognitive route” leads her to 
a clear and distinct perception of the objects of her senses: material things.  What she is 
clearly and distinctly perceiving in bodies is extension.  The meditator’s clear and distinct 
perception of extension is achieved under the attribute of actually existing bodies.  This clear 
and distinct perception is enduring because the meditator is able to eliminate all of the doubts 
that threatened her clear and distinct perception of extension in all of the preceding 
Meditations. 
    I have discussed at length the roles of the meditator’s clear and distinct perceptions of self 
qua thinking thing and of God in developing her clear and distinct perception of extension, 
but I have neglected to discuss her clear and distinct perception of mind-body union.  This is 
perhaps because union is the last of the meditator’s innate ideas she perceives in the 
Meditations.  Though it comes at the final stages of the development of the meditator’s clear 
and distinct perception of extension, its significance cannot be underestimated.  The 
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meditator’s clear and distinct perception of union performs two important functions.  First, 
the meditator’s inclination to believe that sensory ideas are caused by bodies external to her 
certainly comes from the mind-body union.  The inclination serves the union well.  The 
belief that the fire is really there or that the poison is a physical substance that really will 
cause harm is what compels the union to evacuate the burning building or to refrain from 
drinking from the bottle with the skull and crossbones label.  Secondly, the meditator’s clear 
and distinct perception of union helps her to eliminate dream doubt, the last remaining doubt.  
In his discussion of the role of the union, Descartes claims that the union is designed by God 
to inform the mind of what is beneficial or harmful to the union.  He recognizes that he must 
explain why some people have a nature such that it leads them to do what is harmful to the 
union, as in individuals suffering from dropsy.  Descartes gives a long explanation of why 
dropsy is not a counterexample to his claim about the role of the union, but the short 
explanation is that we always have the ability to correct apparent system failures.  God gave 
us five senses and plentiful intellectual faculties all of which can be employed to correct 
system errors.  Descartes’s response to the dropsy case is equally on target in the dream 
doubt case.  Dream doubt can be dismissed because the meditator can use all of her senses 
and intellectual faculties to determine that dream experiences are not linked to other life 
experiences in the same way that waking experiences are. 
Doubts and their Removal 
    Before introducing the “doubt/route/attribute” model for understanding the development of 
the meditator’s clear and distinct perception of extension in the Meditations, I claimed that 
there were four doubts that required removal before this clear and distinct perception could 
be achieved for longer than a moment.  I am now going to review how these doubts were 
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removed in order to yield the enduring, indubitable clear and distinct perception of extension 
the meditator finds herself with in the Sixth Meditation.  The first doubt to appear on the 
scene is illusory doubt, which is invoked by Descartes at the start of the Meditations to begin 
the building of a new foundation for our knowledge.  Illusory doubt refers to general 
skepticism about the senses based on Descartes’s conclusion that we mustn’t trust the senses, 
as they often deceive us.  It is removed partially in the Third and Fifth Meditations and 
completely in the Sixth.  In the Third and Fifth Meditations, the meditator achieves clear and 
distinct perceptions of God, which guarantees that the meditator’s sensory ideas cannot be 
completely misleading.  Because God is no deceiver, it cannot be the case that the 
meditator’s inclination to believe that her sensory ideas are caused by external bodies is 
misleading her.  God’s nature is such that if she is the cause of the meditator’s sensory ideas, 
the meditator must be able to determine that this is so, and, if she is not, the meditator must 
be able to determine what is.  In the Sixth Meditation, the meditator achieves a clear and 
distinct perception of mind-body union.  She is able to ascertain that her inclination to 
believe that her sensory ideas are caused by external bodies comes from the mind-body 
union.  This reinforces her trust in her senses.  
    The second doubt to enter the scene is dream doubt.  In the First Meditation the meditator 
concludes that she cannot be certain of her waking experiences because they are qualitatively 
indistinguishable from dream experiences.  By the close of the Sixth Meditation, the 
meditator knows that waking experience and dream experience almost always are 
distinguishable.   She can use all of her senses and intellectual faculties to determine whether 
the experience in question links up to other waking experiences.     
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    Defective nature doubt follows dream doubt.  Defective nature doubt is eliminated at the 
close of the Fifth Meditation with the meditator’s second, more developed, clear and distinct 
perception of God.  Over the course of the Fourth and Fifth Meditations, the meditator 
discovers that God has given her the ability to correct her errors if she uses her faculties 
correctly.  Thus, she need not feel threatened by defective nature doubt. 
    The final doubt to appear in the Meditations is unknown faculty doubt.  In the Fifth 
Meditation the meditator has a clear and distinct perception of extension under the attribute 
of quantity, but she cannot tell that it is extension she is clearly and distinctly perceiving.  For 
all she knows, she, thinking thing, may be the cause her clear and distinct perception.  That 
is, she may possess an unknown faculty that is causing her to have sensory ideas.  This doubt 
is eliminated in the Sixth Meditation with the proof of the real distinction between mind and 
body and the epistemic transparency thesis.  With their assistance, the meditator can 
confidently conclude that she is aware of all of the present operations of her mind.  Thus, she 
could not be in possession of an active faculty and be ignorant of its operation when it is 
operating.   
    Below you will find a figure representing the “doubt/route/attribute” model as applied to 
the Sixth Meditation proof of the existence of material things.  The representations in figure 
1.3 are identical to those in figures 1.1 and 1.2 with the exception of a few modifications.  
First, you will notice that the indicated facet of the octagon represents the attribute of actually 
existing body and that the upward pointing arrow extending from the rectangle that 
represents the meditator represents the sensation “cognitive route.”  Secondly, you will notice 
that figure 1.3 contains no horizontal line.  The absence of such a line indicates that all of the 
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doubts impeding the meditator’s arrival at an enduring, indubitable clear and distinct 
perception of extension have been eliminated.   
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Section 6.  
Conclusion 
    I have argued that it is important to understand Descartes as developing a clear and distinct 
perception of extension partially in the Second and Fifth Meditations and partially in the 
Sixth.  I have also argued that understanding Descartes in this way requires one to adopt a 
particular interpretive approach, an approach I believe is preferable to others for the reasons I 
cited in the Introduction.  Finally, I have offered a model for understanding Descartes’s 
development of a clear and distinct perception of extension in the Meditations, the 
“doubt/route/attribute” model.   
    This perspective on Descartes’s objective with regard to the wax argument of the Second 
Meditation, the true and immutable natures discussion of the Fifth Meditation, and proof of 
the existence of material things of the Sixth Meditation is attractive for three reasons.  First, it 
displays the connection between the three passages, seeing them as building on each other, 
rather than pursuing wholly independent projects.  Secondly, it makes better sense of 
Descartes’s works considered as a whole.  Descartes explicitly declares that it is his intention 
to develop a distinct concept of extension over the course of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth 
Meditations.  Refusal to take him at his word in the case of the Meditations often results in 
the unwarranted conclusion that Descartes is a Platonist of some kind.  Platonism is clearly 
problematic for Descartes.  Finally, this perspective provides a way of seeing extension as 
following from more fundamental metaphysical premises.  The meditator’s arrival at a clear 
and distinct perception of extension depends upon her having previously clearly and 
distinctly perceived God and self.  Extension was not introduced in an effort to support a 
view on physics, but rather because it followed from metaphysical considerations.      
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